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ABSTRACT
The U.S. Constitution does not include healthcare as a fundamental
legal right nor have the courts declared it so. The clear reluctance of the
Supreme Court to find constitutional support for equal access to healthcare
makes some sense given the synergy between the economics of the
healthcare delivery in the U.S. and the national public health policy
limiting access to medical treatment. Specifically, the current fragmented
system of healthcare delivery and reimbursement is grounded in an
economic system of free market competition. Thus, the notion of universal
coverage is antithetical to a system that makes a profit from limiting access
and rationing care based on profit motive. The best prospect for reform, as
opposed to the piecemeal reforms of the well-intentioned Affordable Care
Act, requires Congress to remove “basic coverage” from private sector
financing and substitute a single payer system that includes core coverage
health services for all. National access to basic coverage would become the
normative baseline for healthcare access and delivery and a positive policy
of healthcare reform.
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These characteristics of the health system—its complexity, its
resistance to change, and the diversity of perspectives within it—give
health-sector reform an episodic and cyclical character. When some
internal or external shock does focus national attention on health-sector
reform, a specific feature of the system is often identified as critical, and
this then becomes a target for major reform efforts. But the initial reform
steps often lead to further, unanticipated problems. And additional rounds
of reform (often less dramatic) can be expected. As a result, the initial
changes are adapted, perfected, and modified (or even disassembled) by
subsequent actions.1
I. THE LEGAL DECISION: HEALTHCARE IS NOT A FUNDAMENTAL
LEGAL RIGHT
A. No Constitutional Right
There is no shortage of scholarly articles asserting that access to
healthcare is a fundamental right in the United States or must be a
fundamental right or should be a fundamental right. In truth, the United
States Constitution does not include a provision granting citizens any right
to healthcare.2 It is worth noting that in 1944, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, in his State of the Union address, advanced his idea of a
“Second Bill of Rights” which would include “[t]he right to adequate
medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health.”3 It is
somewhat of an embarrassment for the United States to acknowledge that
the right to healthcare is recognized in international law and guaranteed in
the constitutions of many nations.4
Because business operates in a regulatory environment that defines the
contours of its activity, it is critical to study the regulatory reality of the
current healthcare system to understand both what is and is not possible.
Indeed, recent events surrounding the attempted passage of the American
Health Care Act of 20175 (AHCA) have so far demonstrated that, for better
or worse, the legislative process controls national healthcare policy and
outcomes.
1. MARC J. ROBERTS ET AL., GETTING HEALTH REFORM RIGHT 5 (2003).
2. See generally U.S. CONST.
3. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, State of the Union Message to Congress (Jan. 11,
1944).
4. TIMOTHY JOST, DISENTITLEMENT? THE THREATS FACING OUR PUBLIC HEALTH CARE
PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSE 3 (2003).
5. American Health Care Act of 2017, H.R. 1628, 115th Cong. (2017).
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Some scholars have proposed a judicial shortcut around this
regulatory logjam; namely, that the courts find that the right to healthcare is
somehow implicit in the constitutional “concept of ordered liberty.”6 While
the courts might engage in such an end run, the Supreme Court of the
United States has shown great reluctance to infer a right to equal access to
healthcare under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment or
any other constitutional provision for that matter.7 The recently hard-
fought court battles over the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(ACA) explain the reasons for this reluctance. For the most part, those
reasons are economic—the Court exercises demonstrable caution when the
advocated change has some potential impact on the private sector and
detracts from the operation of the free market system.8
B. No Support in Case Law
For example, in the case National Federation of Independent Business
(NFIB) v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court concluded, among other things, that
the federal government could not condition the receipt of Medicaid funding
by the States on the States’ agreement to expand Medicaid coverage under
the ACA.9 Instead, any program expansion must be a voluntary choice by
each state. It is evident from the legislative history of the ACA that
Medicaid expansion was written into the plan in a way to create almost
universal health insurance coverage. The Court observed in Sebelius that
the legislative goal of the ACA was to,
‘provide’ near universal medical coverage . . . and without 100%
State participation in the Medicaid program, attainment of this
goal would be thwarted. Even if States could elect to remain in
the old Medicaid program, while declining to participate in the
Expansion, there would be a gaping hole in coverage.10
6. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484, 500 (1965) (stating that “the
foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.”).
7. Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, State Constitutionalism and the Right to Healthcare, 12
J. CONST. L. 1325, 1329-31 (2010).
8. See, FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 529 U.S. 120, 125-26 (2000)
(asserting the proposition that regulatory agencies have no authority to regulate industry in
the private sector beyond the express authority given by Congress); see also, Nat’l Fed’n
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 606 (2012) (concurring with the assertion that “it is
Congress’ role, not the Court’s, to delineate the boundaries of the market the Legislature
seeks to regulate.”).
9. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 519.
10. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 519; see also 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2) (D) (2010) (describing
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As discussed in part VII below, when the mandatory expansion
provision was declared unconstitutional, the decision had a severe negative
impact on the success of the plan, just as predicted by the Supreme Court in
the Sebelius decision.11
Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, found the Medicaid
expansion provisions under the ACA to be a “fundamental change” in
national healthcare; one that unconstitutionally coerced States to accept the
universal healthcare insurance mandate. This, he determined under the
Coercion Doctrine, the federal government could not constitutionally do:
The Medicaid expansion, however, accomplishes a shift in kind,
not merely degree. The original program was designed to cover
medical services for four particular categories of the needy: the
disabled, the blind, the elderly, and needy families with
dependent children. See 42 U. S. C. §1396a(a)(10). Previous
amendments to Medicaid eligibility merely altered and expanded
the boundaries of these categories. Under the Affordable Care
Act, Medicaid is transformed into a program to meet the health
care needs of the entire nonelderly population with income below
133 percent of the poverty level. It is no longer a program to
care for the neediest among us, but rather an element of a
comprehensive national plan to provide universal health
insurance coverage. Indeed, the manner in which the expansion
is structured indicates that while Congress may have styled the
expansion a mere alteration of existing Medicaid, it recognized it
was enlisting the States in a new health care program . . . .
Congress has no authority to order the States to regulate according to
its instructions. Congress may offer the States grants and require the States
to comply with accompanying conditions, but the States must have a
genuine choice whether to accept the offer. The States are given no such
choice in this case: They must either accept a basic change in the nature of
Medicaid, or risk losing all Medicaid funding. The remedy for that
constitutional violation is to preclude the Federal Government from
imposing such a sanction.12
Many have touted the later Supreme Court decision in King v.
Burwell, which upholds the individual mandate under the ACA, requiring
how the requirement achieves near-universal coverage by strengthening the private
employer-based health insurance system).
11. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 519; see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 24–25 (2005)
(holding that the minimum coverage provision is thus an “essential par[t] of a larger
regulation of economic activity”; without the provision, “the regulatory scheme [w]ould be
undercut” (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)).
12. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 583-84, 588 (emphasis added).
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individuals to purchase healthcare insurance or pay a “tax,” as a victory in
the name of broad-based health reform.13 However, this pyrrhic victory
could not ameliorate the real damage already done to the launch of near
universal healthcare coverage by the earlier Sebelius decision. As a result,
the data shows that more than 26 million Americans remain without
insurance coverage after the implementation of the ACA.14 The subsequent
gap in Medicaid coverage occasioned by the substitution of “voluntary”
Medicaid expansion contributed in large measure to this result. That data is
reviewed in greater detail below. In short, the courts have been both
unwilling and unable to bridge the regulatory gap.
II. THE MORAL DECISION: OWNING A GUN IS A FUNDAMENTAL
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
A. Morality
Unquestionably, the United States is an outlier in the major
industrialized global community when it comes to providing basic
universal healthcare (UHC) for all. As reported by the Organization for
Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD):
The majority of OECD member countries have achieved UHC today,
offering all of their citizens affordable access to a core set of health
services. . . . Only a handful of OECD countries report that a very small or
greater proportion of their populations do not have health coverage
(Austria, Belgium, Chile, Greece, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Turkey,
and the United States).15
The United States remains the only major industrialized country that
fails to guarantee access to universal healthcare.16
Perhaps, framing the issue as one of legal entitlement to a core set of
13. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015).
14. Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, Key Facts About the Uninsured Population,
KFF (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.kff.org/uninsured/fact-sheet/key-facts-about-the-uninsur
ed-population/ [https://perma.cc/2AWS-YQTN].
15. OECD, UNIVERSAL HEALTH COVERAGE AND HEALTH OUTCOMES 8 (July 22, 2016),
https://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/Universal-Health-Coverage-and-Health-Outcomes-
OECD-G7-Health-Ministerial-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MW3-LK4U].
16. Cathy Shoen et al., Learning From High Performance Health Systems Around the
Globe, Hearing on “Health Care Coverage and Access: Challenges and Opportunities,”
(2007), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/sites/default/files/documents/___media_files_p
ublications_testimony_2007_jan_learning_from_high_performance_health_systems_around
_the_globe_996_davis_learning_from_high_perform_hlt_sys_around_globe_senate_help_te
stimony_01_10_2007_pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KTL-9HF5].
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healthcare services may be putting the proverbial cart before the horse.
That appears to be the view of the Harvard healthcare economist William
Hsiao who concurs that the “creation of a national healthcare system
involves legal, political, economic, and medical decisions;” however, “the
primary decision,” he concludes, “is a moral one.”17 Thus, as a condition
precedent to the resolution of the legal entitlement question, a moral
decision must be made by a nation to provide real certitude that all should
have equal access to basic care.
Hsiao is followed closely by Professor Reinhardt of Princeton, one of
the world’s preeminent healthcare economists, who concludes that every
nation’s healthcare system reflects that nation’s basic moral values as a
baseline for determining the contours of its healthcare system. He states
that “[t]he fundamental truth about healthcare in every country. . . is that
national values, national character, determine how each system works.” 18
Additionally, “[o]nce a nation decides that it has a moral obligation to
provide healthcare for everybody” and every day, then and only then, does
it begin to build the infrastructure necessary to implement that healthcare
system.19
Morality and economic policy most surely have this symbiotic
relationship identified by Reinhardt. Indeed, “[u]nderstanding the social
conditions that affect resource allocation is at the very heart of economic
thinking.”20
B. A Built-in Conflict of Interest
Moral decision-making is a very difficult starting point for the United
States given its economic commitment to free enterprise control in the
healthcare markets. “Most countries rely on free-market enterprise to
provide health care—but not to pay for it.”21 Accordingly, providers can
make profit in the delivery (fee for service) but cannot make profit in the
payment (non-profit financing).22 That model well describes the healthcare
17. T.R. REID, THE HEALING OF AMERICA 215 (Penguin Books ed., 2010) [hereinafter
Reid].
18. Newsweek Staff, Universal Healthcare is a Moral Choice, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 9,
2009, 8:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/universal-health-care-moral-choice-79223 [http
s://perma.cc/8HM4-2NF7].
19. Reid, supra note 17, at 269-70.
20. R.D. Scott et al., Applying Economic Principles to Health Care, 7 EMERGING
INFECTIOUS DISEASES (SPECIAL ISSUE) 282, 282 (2001).
21. Reid, supra note 17, at 239 (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 239-40.
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system currently in effect in Canada, for example.23 In contrast,
[t]he United States is the only nation that lets insurance
companies extract a profit from basic health coverage” in the
payment system.24 It is the only nation where healthcare for most
of the population is financed by for-profit, minimally regulated
private insurance companies.25 Not surprisingly, these financing
arrangements have guaranteed that at least one-sixth of the
population will be “uninsured at any given time, and it leaves
others at risk of losing insurance as a result of [normal life course
events] (such as losing one’s job).26
Here is where the “condition precedent” moral policy judgement
collides with managerial capitalism.27 The result of free market control of
the healthcare industry is an apparent conflict of interest between the moral
principle of providing a baseline of equal access and the free market pursuit
of profit.
Reinhardt’s study examining access to pharmaceutical specialty drugs
helps to contextualize this point.28 Fiduciary duty, a central legal
organizing principle for managerial capitalism in the United States, dictates
that officers and directors must act within the law to maximize shareholder
wealth.29 Accordingly, pharmaceutical companies, as any other product
manufacturer, will naturally seek by any legal means the maximum revenue
for a new product, including specialty lifesaving drugs.30 This includes the
economic practice of profit-maximizing price discrimination, which means
charging different prices to different customers for identical items with
identical production costs.31 (This point will be discussed in greater detail
below in the context of payer mix and cost shifting). Reinhardt notes that:
“[t]he investor-owned producers of new specialty drugs properly call this
approach ‘value pricing,’ because it is based on their subjective estimate of
the maximum value society imputes to the added [quality adjusted life
23. Id. at 134-39.
24. Id. at 239.
25. Id. at 239-40.
26. Jill Quadagno, Why the United States Has No National Health Insurance:
Stakeholder Mobilization Against the Welfare State, 1945–1996, 45 J. HEALTH & SOC.
BEHAV. 25, 25 (2004).
27. T.R. Reid observes: “That’s why U.S. Health insurance companies are loathed by
their customers but loved by Wall Street.” Reid, supra note 17, at 239.
28. Uwe Reinhardt, The JAMA Forum Probing Our Moral Values in Healthcare: The
Pricing of Specialty Drugs, 314 J. AM. MED. ASS’N n.10 981, 982 (2015).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Kenneth Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Healthcare, 53 AM.
ECON. REV. 941, 958-67 (1963).
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years] QALYs these products can produce.”32
However, in the pursuit of this pricing strategy, specialty drug
producers are hardly free-enterprisers operating within competitive
markets. On the contrary, the drug producers benefit from government
protectionism that shields their operation from free competition by granting
valuable patents to these producers and creating an artificial monopoly.33
Patent protections also prohibit resale of these specialty drugs among
customers, such as reimporting drugs from countries that have been granted
lower prices.34
The problem of drug patents inhibiting the dissemination of lifesaving
drugs to disease sufferers was most pronounced with the refusal of U.S.
companies to provide compulsory patents for AIDS drugs in Kenya.35
Given the obvious conflict between the moral decision to release lifesaving
drugs and the fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder wealth, Reinhardt
postulates that the line has been crossed from the need to protect private
enterprise to the need to regulate for the health, safety and welfare of the
citizens.36
The government has to be mindful of the social opportunity costs of
high health care spending, which means beneficial activities such as
education and infrastructure that are displaced by high spending on health
care.
The social opportunity costs of high drug prices depend heavily on the
incidence and prevalence of the disease being targeted by a drug. For a
genuine orphan drug that could benefit only a small number of patients, a
high price would have only a small effect on total health spending
(although its cost would be devastating for an uninsured individual unless
that person received financial assistance to acquire the drug).37
Undoubtedly, free enterprisers will counter by arguing that denying
investors return on investment will discourage private investors to foster
medical innovation. And, it is an economic truth that “[i]nvestors’
compensation should help them not only recover their outlays for
developing new products but also include a premium for assuming the
financial risk that such investments may” fail.38 This economic tautology,
32. Reinhardt, supra note 28.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Ben Sihanya, Patents, Parallel Importation and Compulsory Licensing of
HIV/AIDS Drugs: The Experience of Kenya, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, https://www.wt
o.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case19_e.htm [https://perma.cc/2DBH-QRNU].
36. Reinhardt, supra note 28.
37. Reinhardt, supra note 28.
38. Reinhardt, supra note 28.
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combined with the historic resistance to universal health coverage by the
powerful American Medical Association, insurance company lobbyists, and
the labor unions engaged in collective bargaining, has created a stonewall
preventing UHC and equal access to available treatment.39 The existence
of a clear conflict of interest between profit and equal access to treatment is
evident. Market competition in the delivery of healthcare may, however,
continue to have a place in the supplemental insurance market.
Arguably, the free enterprise model, as it relates to both the financing
and delivery of healthcare, is not fully aligned with the moral decision to
provide an UHC system. As noted below, this is a conclusion reached by
several healthcare economists.
C. A Call for Intervention: Economists and Legislators
Indeed, the call for government intervention and the
acknowledgement that ordinary free enterprise is a proven failed economic
model when it comes to managing healthcare is not new. The Pulitzer
Prize winning Stanford economist, Kenneth Arrow, made the case for
government regulation of healthcare in 1963.40 Arrow argued that
healthcare does not neatly fit into the confines of ordinary free market
enterprise for many reasons including, totally unpredictable individual
demand, lack of sure knowledge of what will cure, the built-in gross
imbalance of knowledge between seller and buyer, and an inevitable lack
of transparent prices.41 For example, a typical consumer has no need for
healthcare for decades and then is suddenly stricken with an illness or
catastrophic event that will cost hundreds of thousands of treatment dollars.
The consumer, due to this severe medical condition, is likely to be unable
to make any reasoned free-market choice. Under the best of circumstances,
the consumer can’t know how well a particular treatment will work or what
further treatment may be necessary or how much the cost will be and over
what period. Comparison shopping is simply inapposite in this market.42
Instead, the patient must rely on the provider’s medical judgment given that
the consumer lacks independent competing knowledge in the specialized
field of medicine. The patient experience operates in a market environment
that encourages doctors and hospitals to do as much as possible, and
39. Quadagno, supra note 26.
40. Arrow, supra note 31.
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Mariam Koshy, Is Healthcare a Market? 24 (Nov. 24, 2015) (unpublished
M.S. thesis, DELFT University of Technology) (on file with the DELFT University of
Technology) (explaining consumer rationality related to comparing prices).
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insurers to pay for as little as possible.43 The free market consumer is thus,
the most disadvantaged stakeholder in the process in terms of knowledge
and access to information.
Others agree with the Arrow analysis as well. Like Arrow, some
argue that the paradigm of healthcare delivery defies the model of free
enterprise, a sort of round peg in a square-hole analysis. Scott and his co-
authors maintain:
[The] [e]xamination of resource allocation in the healthcare
industry is complicated because the market characteristics differ
from those in a perfectly competitive market.44 The market for
health-care services is considered an imperfect market because:
1) healthcare is a heterogeneous product, as the patient can
experience a range of outcomes; 2) patients who are insured have
third-party payers covering their direct medical expenses; and, 3)
a “market price” is lacking, i.e., no feedback mechanism exists
that reflects the value of the resources used in health care.45
They conclude that while the perspectives of consumers, producers,
and society converge in a perfectly competitive market, hospital patient
costs in the healthcare market are different for patients (consumers), health-
care providers (suppliers), insurance companies (third-party payers), and
society.46
Hsiao and Heller likewise observe:
The supply side dominates the demand side in the health services
market. Professional dominance prevails due to the asymmetry
of information between physicians and patients. If left
unchecked, the medical profession can exercise its monopolistic
power to induce demand and set high prices, leading to rapid
health cost inflation and a deterioration in the quality of
services.”47
However unpalatable in a free market economy, the model of free
enterprise may not be necessarily suitable for every economic activity
including healthcare. Hsiao and Heller conclude that:
Although many countries have tried regulatory remedies to
43. Patrick Rivers & Saundra Glover, Healthcare Competition, Strategic Mission, and
Patient Satisfaction: Research Models and Propositions, 22 J. HEALTH ORGAN. MANAG.
627, 627-30 (2008).
44. Scott et al., supra note 20.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. William Hsiao & Peter S. Heller, What Should Macroeconomist Know About
Healthcare? 6 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper, 2007).
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correct the market failures in the voluntary private insurance
market, no country has succeeded. On the other hand,
international experience shows that government-managed “free”
public health services tend to be inefficient and nonresponsive to
patients’ needs. Market mechanisms can provide services that
are more efficient and higher in quality than government-
managed free services.48
Thus, the regulatory vision of reform should be one suitably designed
to find a solution to the failures that characterize the voluntary private
insurance market. As discussed below, the states may provide some
guidance in this regard.
In any case, having arguably settled the long debate between free
enterprise and increased regulation in favor of government intervention, the
moral determination should be easy. But it’s not. Over fifty years have
passed since Arrow called for regulatory intervention. It may be fair to
conclude that the politics of healthcare and the special interest groups who
may impact legislative judgment have refuted both conventional moral and
economic judgment. This is true at least at the federal level in the U.S.
Interestingly, in a break from traditional political and special interest
thinking, the California legislature recently proposed in 2017 the Healthy
California Act.49 The Act introduces a single payer healthcare system that
provides universal coverage within the state. Parenthetically, Colorado
voters overwhelmingly rejected a similar proposal in 2016 amid
widespread concerns about the cost.50 The single payer plan introduced in
Vermont also failed to pass in 2014 after the legislature disagreed about
how to finance it.51
In 2017, the Pew Research Center conducted a national survey to
determine public opinion and found that “60% of Americans say the
government should be responsible for ensuring health care coverage for all
Americans, compared with 38% who [disagree and] say this should not be
the government’s responsibility.”52 Those supporting government
48. Id. at 9.
49. SB 562, Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2017).
50. Bruce Jaspen, Colorado Rejects Single-Payer Healthcare Insurance, FORBES
MAGAZINE (Nov. 9, 2016, 12:57 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/2016/11/0
9/colorado-rejects-single-payer-healthcare-insurance/#1820dd547067 [https://perma.cc/V7P
H-MTJZ].
51. Jay Fitzgerald, Costs Derail Vermont’s Dream of a Single Payer Healthcare
System, BOSTON GLOBE (Jan. 25, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2015/01/25/
costs-derail-vermont-single-payer-health-plan/VTAEZFGpWvTen0QFahW0pO/story.html
[https://perma.cc/P9CZ-Q4WL].
52. Kristen Bialik, More Americans say government should ensure health care
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regulation increased from 51% in 2016 and is at the “highest point in nearly
a decade”53 perhaps signaling a shift in support of universal healthcare.
The Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads: “A well-
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of
the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”54 It could be
argued that a guarantee of equal access to basic healthcare should have
equal footing with whatever moral decision was made by the framers to
ensure the constitutional right of the citizenry to own a gun.
III. THE SPENDING CRISIS: IT’S NOT LIKE WE DON’T SPEND
An important question confronting all countries is the appropriate
level of healthcare spending.55 Although health care spending is one of the
most important determinants of health status, health spending may be too
high in developed industrial countries.56 Given the large inefficiencies of
health care systems, attacking these inefficiencies may be the best route to
improve health outcomes, rather than increasing spending. In any case, the
U.S. is the biggest spender per capita in the world.57 Based upon data
supplied by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
National Health Expenditures Data, “U.S. health care spending grew 3.9
percent in 2017, reaching $3.5 trillion or $10,739 per person. As a share of
the nation’s Gross Domestic Product, health spending accounted for 17.9
percent.”58
coverage, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (January 13, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tan
k/2017/01/13/more-americans-say-government-should-ensure-health-care-coverage/ [https:/
/perma.cc/S3UD-QLSU].
53. Id.
54. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
55. William D. Savedoff, What Should a Country Spend on Health Care?, 26 HEALTH
AFF., 962, 962–70 (2007).
56. Burton A. Weisbrod, The Health Care Quadrilemma: An Essay on Technological
Change, Quality of Care and Cost Containment, 29 J. ECON. LITERATURE, 523, 523–52
(1991); Elizabeth Docteur & Howard Oxley, Health-Care Systems: Lessons from the
Reform Experience, (Directorate for Emp’t, Labour and Soc. Aff., OECD Health Working
Paper No. 9, 2003).
57. Joseph Burns, Hey, Big Spender! Why Does Your Quality Lag So Far Behind Other
Countries?, MANAGED CARE (Sept. 3, 2018), https://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/
2018/9/hey-big-spender-why-does-your-quality-lag-so-far-behind-other-countries [https://pe
rma.cc/7NPG-CMT7].
58. National Health Expenditure Data: Historical, CMS.GOV, https://www.cms.gov/re
search-statistics-data-and-systems/statistics-trends-and-reports/nationalhealthexpenddata/nat
ionalhealthaccountshistorical.html (last modified December 11, 2018) [https://perma.cc/JG6
T-QX32].
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A. The Efficiency Principle
CMS data is used in this paper to analyze funding sources and health
spending by major sources of funds and spending by type of service or
product. The question examined in this analysis is whether the country that
spends the highest percentage of GDP on healthcare and the most money
per capita in the world is getting the best “bang for its buck” in terms of
efficient healthcare delivery and quality.
If not, then arguably the analysis supplies additional support for the
conclusion that the free enterprise system of healthcare is not more efficient
than other spending models. Those spending models may include single
payer systems utilized by other OECD countries that show better overall
healthcare results in terms of quality of care. That would lead to the further
conclusion that a single payer system is not “socialism” or “welfare
spending.” Instead, a single payer system combined with a managed care
agenda might provide the most efficient delivery of a basic core of
healthcare services to everyone.
This analysis also benefits from the application of the Efficiency
Principle. The textbook definition describes the Efficiency Principle as
“[a]n economic theory that states that the maximum social benefit that is
received from any type of action is received when the marginal social costs
of resource allocation is equal to the benefits from such an allocation of
resources.”59 From a purely pragmatic viewpoint, the Efficiency Principle
is another way of talking about the cost benefit analysis and decision
making in the business context.
Interestingly, the Efficiency Principle has been applied to healthcare,
albeit with some difficulty. Economists point out that “[t]he application of
basic textbook principles to understanding economic behavior in the
healthcare industry is not [easy] because of the complex nature of
healthcare as a service or product.”60 They observe that healthcare can’t be
pulled off a shelf and paid for like most goods.61 Not to mention that
whatever the desired result, nothing is certain in treatment and healthy
results cannot be guaranteed or provided with a warranty.62 Indeed, the
ultimate success or failure of healthcare delivery depends on various
factors, many of which are beyond the control of the healthcare provider.
Accordingly, the economic analysis here focuses on the “fundamental
59. What is Efficiency Principle, THE LAW DICTIONARY, https://thelawdictionary.org/ef
ficiency-principle/ [https://perma.cc/Y8J2-666R] (last visited Apr. 16, 2019).
60. Scott et al., supra note 20.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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notion of efficient use of available resources.”63 In the healthcare context,
the focus is narrowed to two basic concepts: “(1) economics is about
resource allocation, and (2) efficiency in resource use (getting the most
from available resources).”64
B. Data Analysis
CMS National Health Expenditure Data is harvested from a variety of
sources, of which the most important is provider claims filed for all types
of services provided.65 CMS also collects and retains extensive cost
information based on regular cost reports submitted by participating
facilities.66 “Quality information is collected from surveys done by the
Joint Commission and state agencies and is entered into the Online Survey
Certification and Reporting (OSCAR) database.”67 Individual source data
is not publicly available due to privacy concerns. External secondary use
of the data is part of CMS’ mission to encourage further research.68 The
CMS data further analyzes where the healthcare dollars are coming from
and how those dollars are being spent.69 Also using the CMS data, a
comparison can be made regarding the relative health benefits derived from
the current system using global OECD data.70 Finally, the data will be
examined in terms of the Efficiency Principle applying a cost benefit
analysis.
In 2015, the federal government accounted for the largest share of
health care spending 29%, followed by households 28.1%, private
businesses 19.9%, and state and local governments 17.1%.71 As
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. National Health Expenditure Data: Historical, supra note 58.
66. Id.
67. Sources and Uses of Data Within the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services,
NCBI (2012) available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK189626/ [https://perma.
cc/QS82-PVXL].
68. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, STRATEGIES AND
PRIORITIES FOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AT THE CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID
SERVICES 147 (Edward Shortliffe & Lynette Millett eds., 2012).
69. CMS, NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURE DATA BY TYPE OF SERVICE AND SOURCE OF
FUNDS, (1960-2017), https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/statistics-
trends-and-reports/nationalhealthexpenddata/nationalhealthaccountshistorical.html [https://p
erma.cc/SLK4-B7BL].
70. OECD, HEALTH AT A GLANCE 2015: OECD INDICATORS 3 (2015), http://www.keepe
ek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/social-issues-migration-health/health-at-a-glance-2
015_health_glance-2015-en#.WVkxwYjysdU [https://perma.cc/M3Y4-BHF6].
71. NHE Fact Sheet, CMS.GOV, https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-syste
ms/statistics-trends-and-reports/nationalhealthexpenddata/nhe-fact-sheet.html (last modified
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summarized in Table I, Chart 1, Healthcare Spending by Source of Funds,
74% of the $3.2 trillion dollars for 2015, comes from public and private
health insurance.72 Thus, the health insurance percentage is comprised of
the following varied payer mix. Medicare has a 20% share.73 Medicare
spending grew 4.5% to $646.2 billion in 2015, which was a slight reduction
from the 4.8% growth percent in 2014.74 Medicaid has a 17% share.75
Total Medicaid spending also slowed slightly in 2015 to 9.5% but
continued the strong growth that began in 2014 of 11.5%.76 State and local
Medicaid expenditures grew 1.6%, while Federal Medicaid expenditures
increased 12.5% in 2015.77 Private Health Insurance had a 33% share.78
Total private health insurance expenditures increased 7.2 % to $1.1 trillion
in 2015, faster than the 5.8 % growth in 2014.79 According to CMS, the
increase in 2015 was influenced by the expansion of insurance coverage
under the ACA and the corresponding drop in the number of individuals
without health insurance.80 Even with increases in coverage in the
insurance markets under the ACA, the Out-of-Pocket 11% share is
instructive. Out-of-pocket spending grew 2.6% in 2015 to $338.1 billion,
slightly faster than the growth of 1.4% in 2014.81 Evidence that the gap in
coverage remains a continuing problem.
As summarized in Table I, Chart 2, Health Spending by Type of
Service or Product:
Feb. 20, 2019) [https://perma.cc/6GTP-BP5T]. See infra Table I, Chart 1.
72. See infra Table I, Chart 1.
73. Id.
74. CMS Releases 2015 National Health Expenditures, CMS.GOV (Dec. 16, 2016)
https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/press-releases/cms-releases-2015-national-health-expendit
ures [https://perma.cc/AKA3-L9XZ].
75. See infra Table I, Chart 1.
76. Press Release CMS Office of the Actuary Releases 2016 National Health
Expenditures, CMS.GOV (Dec. 06, 2017), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/press-releases/c
ms-office-actuary-releases-2016-national-health-expenditures [https://perma.cc/46XH-2N8
P].
77. National Health Care Spending in 2016, CMA, https://www.cms.gov/Research-
Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Dow
nloads/NHE-Presentation-Slides.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7X3-FJ3R] (last visited Mar. 8,
2019).
78. NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURE DATA BY TYPE OF SERVICE AND SOURCE OF FUNDS,
supra note 69.
79. CMS Releases 2015 National Health Expenditures, supra note 74.
80. Micah Hartman et al., National Health Care Spending In 2016: Spending And
Enrollment Growth Slow After Initial Coverage Expansions, 37 HEALTH AFFAIRS (Dec. 6,
2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/full/10.1377/hlthaff.2017.1299 [https://perma.cc/6
DFC-CBKX].
81. CMS Releases 2015 National Health Expenditures, supra note 74.
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Spending for hospital care increased 5.6% to $1.0 trillion in 2015
compared to 4.6% growth in 2014. The faster growth in 2015
was driven by continued growth in non-price factors such as the
use and intensity of services . . . . Spending on physician and
clinical services increased 6.3% in 2015 to $631.1 billion. This
was an increase in growth of 4.8% in 2014 and was the first time
since 2005 that the growth rate exceeded 6.0%.82
According to CMS, “as with hospitals, the faster growth in overall
physician and clinical services spending was driven by continued growth in
nonprice factors.”83 Spending for other professional services reached $87.7
billion in 2015, this was an increase of 5.9% and an acceleration from
growth of 5.1% in 2014.84 “Spending in this category includes
establishments of independent health practitioners (except physicians and
dentists) that primarily provide services such as physical therapy,
optometry, podiatry, or chiropractic medicine.”85 Retail prescription drug
spending decelerated in 2015, increasing 9% to $324.5 billion.86 The CMS
observes that spending on prescription drugs outpaced all other services in
2015, even though growth in 2015 was slower than the 12.4% growth in
2014.87 The strong spending growth for prescription drugs is attributed to
the “increased spending on new medicines [], price growth for existing
brand name drugs, increased spending on generics,” and fewer expensive
drugs going off-patent.88
The total healthcare spending in the U.S., as a percentage of overall
GDP, according to data provided by the Commonwealth Fund, is the
highest in the world and the highest among major industrialized countries.89
82. CMS Report: Health Care Spending Reached $3.2 Trillion in 2015, MANAGED
CARE (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.managedcaremag.com/news/cms-report-health-care-spen
ding-reached-32-trillion-2015 [https://perma.cc/7Y7X-VXRD].
83. Id.
84. Clayton Chau, Mental Health Services, PROVIDENCE ST. JOSEPH HEALTH,
https://residency-scal-kaiserpermanente.org/healthpolicyelective/wp-content/uploads/sites/8
/2018/05/Clayton-Chau-MENTAL-HEALTH-SERVICES.2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4VT
-MUNT] (last visited Mar. 9, 2019).
85. Id.
86. Greg Jacobson, Rise in U.S. health care spending outpaces economic growth,
CHAIN DRUG REVIEW (Jan. 2, 2017), https://www.chaindrugreview.com/rise-in-u-s-health-
care-spending-outpaces-economic-growth/ [https://perma.cc/E9AN-CLCR].
87. CMS Report: Health Care Spending Reached $3.2 Trillion in 2015, supra note 82.
88. CMS Releases 2015 National Health Expenditures, supra note 74.
89. U.S. Spends More Income on Health Than Other Nations But Has Lower Life
Expectancy, Worse Health, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.commo
nwealthfund.org/publications/press-releases/2015/oct/us-spends-more-on-health-care-than-
other-nations [https://perma.cc/8KM2-CTTD] (last visited Jan. 23, 2019) [hereinafter THE
COMMONWEALTH FUND].
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The global comparison chart of OECD countries is in Table II. OECD data
in Table III shows that the U.S. is ranked number one in healthcare
spending among major industrialized countries.90 It is ranked in the bottom
one-third of doctors and hospital beds per capita and in the middle
one/third of nurses per capita.91 Consistent with the CMS data, the U.S. is
ranked number one in technology spending for MRI units and CT scanners
per capita.92 Given the superiority in expenditure, the resulting quality
outcomes are at best disappointing.
OECD data from 2015 compares select health care outcomes among
major industrialized countries. As demonstrated in Table IV, the results
show that the U.S. has the lowest life expectancy rate and highest child
mortality rate by comparison.93 This is not surprising given that the OECD
lists the U.S. in the bottom one-third performers for overall access to care.94
As reflected in Table V, OECD Table, the top performers in terms of
access to care are countries with the lowest expenditure as a share of
household consumption, the lowest unmet care needs or lowest waiting
times.95 Table VI, OECD data compares quality of care indicators.96
Again, by comparison, the U.S. is in the bottom one-third for asthma and
COPD admission and diabetes hospital admission.97 It is also in the bottom
one-third for cervical cancer survival.98 It is in the middle one-third for
colorectal cancer survival.99 The U.S. is in the top one-third in three of the
reported categories: case fatality for ASI, case fatality for ischemic stroke
admission, and breast cancer survival.100
Thus, the assumption that spending more produces superior
population health outcomes is flawed. The bottom line is that the U.S. is
spending much more for much less.
C. Cost/Benefit Analysis: Distortions in the Free Market System
As reflected in the data, the U.S. spent more per person on healthcare
than 12 other high-income nations in 2015, while seeing the lowest life
90. See infra Table III.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See infra Table IV.
94. OECD, supra note 70, at 24.
95. See infra Table V.
96. See infra Table VI.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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expectancy and some of the worst health outcomes among this group. The
analysis further shows that in the U.S., which spent an average of $9,990
per person annually, life expectancy was 78.8 years. Switzerland, the
second-highest-spending country, spent $6,325 per person and had a life
expectancy of 82.9 years. Mortality rates for cancer were among the
lowest in the U.S., but rates of chronic conditions, obesity, and infant
mortality were higher than those abroad.101
In short, the amount of money being spent is not gaining comparable
health outcomes.
Some free enterprisers rebuke the suggestion of a system of UHC as
nothing more than socialism. However, the data indicates that the current
U.S. system of payment subsidies per capita for Medicare and Medicaid
may well exceed the per capita expenditures made by other national
healthcare systems.102 “Despite being the only country in the [OECD]
study without universal health care coverage, government spending on
health care in the U.S.,” principally for Medicare and Medicaid, “was high
as well, at $4,197 per person. . . . By comparison, the U.K., where all
residents are covered by the National Health Service, spent $2,802 per
person.”103 While some free enterprisers complain that universal healthcare
begets a form of socialism, it looks by the size of current U.S. government
subsidies that the U.S. subsidizes more healthcare than the socialist
economies but less efficiently. Thus, healthcare subsidies in the U.S. free
market system cost more per capita than if the U.S. simply adopted a single
payer national healthcare system more akin to other major globalized
countries.
Moreover, the data reveals another flawed assumption which is that
most of the money being spent is on basic healthcare services.104 In fact,
CMS data reflects that over 50% of spending in the United States by
products and services is expended on physicians and hospital care.105 The
Commonwealth Fund study in 2015 concluded, however, that this amount
of “healthcare spending per person is highest in the United States not
because Americans go to doctors and hospitals more often, but because of
greater use of medical technology and healthcare prices that are higher than
101. THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, supra note 89.
102. America is a health-care outlier in the developed world, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 26,
2018) https://www.economist.com/special-report/2018/04/26/america-is-a-health-care-outlie
r-in-the-developed-world [https://perma.cc/4BXB-9JPS].
103. THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, supra note 89.
104. National Health Expenditure Data: Historical, supra note 58.
105. Id.
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those in other nations.”106 For example, in terms of both pricing and use:
People in the United States visit doctors an average of four times per
year; only residents of Switzerland, New Zealand, and Sweden have fewer
visits. Americans also go to the hospital relatively infrequently, with 126
visits per every 1000 people, compared to 252 visits in Germany, where the
rate is highest.107
Americans receive the most diagnostic imaging exams, including
MRIs, CT scans, PET exams. The average U.S. adult also takes more
prescription drugs than adults in all the other countries except New
Zealand.108
Prescription drugs are most expensive in the U.S., with prices twice as
high as in the U.K., Australia, and Canada.109
Prices for health services are considerably higher in the United States
than elsewhere. On average, heart bypass surgery costs $75,345 in the
United States, compared to $15,742 in the Netherlands, where the
procedure is least expensive.110
Simply put, it is not just that U.S. consumers may have higher
utilization of services than other countries, but those services cost more to
provide than the provision of similar services in countries with national
health systems. Indeed, the costs for the same healthcare services vary
nationwide. The following provides illustrations of the type of healthcare
cost inflation forewarned by Reinhardt and others:
ÿ The average inpatient hospital charges for a patient getting a joint
replacement may range “from $5,300 at a hospital in Ada, Okla[homa] to
$223,000 at a hospital in Monterey Park, Calif[ornia].”111
ÿ A Medicare patient with heart failure in Denver can cost anywhere
from $21,000 to $46,000. Meanwhile, in Jackson, Mississippi, heart failure
care may cost from $9,000 to $51,000.112
The typical checks and balances of a free enterprise system, relying on
the movement of natural market forces of supply, demand, and optimum
106. THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, supra note 89.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Rich Daley, CMS Data Show Wide Variation in Hospital Billing, MODERN
HEALTHCARE (May 8, 2013, 2:30 PM), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20130508
/NEWS/305089960 [https://perma.cc/JM2P-CELW].
112. Id.; Medicare Provider Payment and Utilization Data, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVICES (2013), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Sta
tistics-Trends-and-Reports/Medicare-Provider-Charge-Data/index.html [https://perma.cc/6P
X8-Q6KV].
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price point, seemingly do nothing to reduce those costs as in other markets.
That is not surprising given Arrow’s reasoning that the current delivery
system is not designed to utilize the principles of a free market economy in
the provision of healthcare services.113 In fact, the United States depends
on a fragmented delivery system that controls the delivery and pricing of
domestic healthcare.114 That system is not a free enterprise system but is
instead one that is a mixture of payer systems that continually shift the
costs of the healthcare to those with greater ability to bear the burden.115
The data supports the conclusion that the fragmented healthcare system in
the United States is costly, unfair and inefficient.
IV. THE FRAGMENTED HEALTHCARE SYSTEM: PROFIT-
MAXIMIZING PRICE DISCRIMINATION
The economic practice of profit-maximizing price discrimination is a
corollary of a fragmented multilayer payer system found in the United
States. Charging different prices to different customers for identical items
with identical production costs is a hallmark of the U.S. system and
referred to as “value pricing.”116 Here, the notion of “value” is measured
wholly based upon a subjective estimate of the maximum value society
imputes to the added quality adjusted life years (QALYs) these products
produce.117 Pricing is, therefore, disconnected from the traditional free
market analysis, and, instead, the pricing is determined by the threshold of
what one is willing and able to pay to prolong one’s life.118 This, of course,
gives the economic notion of “demand” an entirely different meaning.
Pricing turns on a life or death decision instead of supply, demand, and
obsolescence.
Additionally, different prices are charged to different customers for
identical services because there are at least five payer systems in the United
113. Arrow, supra note 31. For example, one study found that United States spending
on health care could be reduced by $36 billion a year if the 108 million Americans with
employer-sponsored coverage comparison shopped for 300 common medical procedures.
BOBBI COLUNI, SAVE $36 BILLION IN U.S. HEALTHCARE SPENDING THROUGH PRICE
TRANSPARENCY 1 (Feb. 2012).
114. Arrow, supra note 31.
115. Id.
116. Martha Hostetter & Sarah Klein, Healthcare Price Transparency: Can it Promote
High-Value Care?, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publi
cations/newsletter-article/health-care-price-transparency-can-it-promote-high-value-care [htt
ps://perma.cc/9P6E-5C4G].
117. Mathew D. Adler, QUALYs and Policy Evaluation: A New Perspective, 6 YALE J.
HEALTH POL’Y & ETHICS 1-2 (2006).
118. Id. at 2, 35-37.
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States, some more richly endowed with cash than others.119 This also leads
to the inevitable conclusion that the burden of healthcare cost is not borne
equally by healthcare recipients nor do all recipients have equal access to
treatment given different payer systems with different coverage
limitations.120 Many are not covered at all.121
These multiple payer systems target different populations and the
system designs are themselves variants of several pre-existing European
and North American single payer systems.122 Some of those systems use
government delivery mechanisms while others use private sector delivery
systems.123 Accordingly, in the aggregate, the U.S. system shares some
similarities with these individual country models but does not neatly fit into
any one of them.124 In short, the United States maintains separate but
unequal systems of healthcare access for separate classes of people while
other countries have adopted a single-payer system for everyone based
upon equitable access principles, efficiency, and overall bureaucratic
simplicity.125
A. The Five System Fragments
The Beveridge Model, originating in Great Britain, was adopted in the
United States to cover health services for veterans, active duty-duty
military personnel, and Native Americans.126 The system is operated by the
U.S. government through the Veteran’s Administration using the Tri-Star
system.127 Physicians are government employees working in government
owned hospitals and clinics.128 The recipient never receives a bill.129
The Medicare Model, originating in Canada, (even the name was
invented there) was adopted by the United States for people over sixty-
five.130 It is the closest that the United States comes to a universal
healthcare system. The system is funded by payroll tax dollars deposited
into a government trust fund earmarked solely for this program. The
119. Reid, supra note 17, at 20-24.
120. Id. at 42.
121. Id. at 20.
122. Id. at 17–21.
123. Id. at 41-42.
124. Id. at 21.
125. Id. at 41.
126. Id. at 17-18, 20.
127. Id. at 20.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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Medicare budget is not included in the regular annual U.S. budget but
resides in the tax expenditures budget and is not discretionary like other
regular budget items. Because Medicare does not fund 100% of all medical
costs, many recipients purchase supplemental insurance in the private
insurance marketplace.131
The Bismark Model, utilized in some variation in Germany, France,
Japan, Switzerland, and others is for fulltime employees who get coverage
through an employer.132 Here, the employer and employee share the
premium payment and the insurer pays the lion’s share for the treatment
with the patient making copayments and accepting responsibility for the
deductible under the policy. 133 This is particularly attractive to employers
in the United States because the employer portion of the premium is a
deductible expense for tax purposes and the employee receives the
compensation benefit tax free.134 For highly paid executives, employers
can provide “Cadillac” health insurance plans to boost the executive’s
compensation without creating a taxable event.135 There is a cap on the
amount of coverage under these plans.136 However, the additional ACA
requirement that small businesses with fifty or more fulltime employees
provide employee health insurance or pay a penalty was not well received
due to relatively high out-of-pocket costs to small business owners.137 It is
not unusual for small business owners to either pay the ACA penalty or
side step the requirement by refusing to hire employees full-time and
instead providing only part time employment. This is an otherwise
131. Market Trends: Medicare Supplement, GORMAN HEALTH GROUP, LLC (Dec. 1,
2016), https://www.gormanhealthgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/GHG-Medicare-S
upplement-Market-Trend-Analysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6DW-QWDB].
132. Reid, supra note 17, at 17.
133. Id. at 20.
134. See Small Business & Self-Employed: Employee Benefits, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/
businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/employee-benefits [https://perma.cc/4HTV-QC3
E] (last updated Nov. 2, 2018) (“If an employer pays the cost of an accident or health
insurance plan for his/her employees, including an employee’s spouse and dependents, the
employer’s payments are not wages and are not subject to Social Security, Medicare, and
FUTA taxes, or federal income tax withholding.”).
135. AARP Health Law Answers: What is a Health Cadillac Plan?, AARP (2018), https:
//healthlawanswers.aarp.org/en/en/what-cadillac-plan [https://perma.cc/43FR-Q9GC].
136. Mathew Fiedler, How to Interpret the Cadillac Tax Rate: A Technical Note,
BROOKINGS (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/usc-brookings-schaeffer-on-hea
lth-policy/2018/02/01/how-to-interpret-the-cadillac-tax-rate-a-technical-note/ [https://perma.
cc/2QDW-2TAC].
137. How the Affordable Care Act Affects Small Business?, HEALTHCARE.GOV (2018), ht
tps://www.healthcare.gov/small-businesses/health-care-law-and-businesses/how-aca-affects-
businesses/ [https://perma.cc/P8VB-X89V].
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unforeseen negative economic consequence.138
The Medicaid Model was enacted into law during the Johnson
administration to finance state healthcare programs in partnership with the
federal government for the disabled, blind, elderly, and needy families with
children.139 Medicaid represents one dollar out of every six dollars spent on
health care in the United States and is the major source of financing for
states to provide coverage.140 The Medicaid program is jointly funded by
the states and the federal government. The federal government guarantees
matching funds to states based on actual costs for qualifying Medicaid
expenditures; states are guaranteed at least one dollar in federal funds for
every one dollar in state spending on the program.141 The ACA broadened
Medicaid’s role, in an attempt to create universal coverage for nearly all
low-income Americans with incomes up to 138% of the federal poverty
level (FPL) ($16,242 per year for an individual in 2015).142
As noted previously, the Supreme Court rendered expansion by the
states optional. For those states that chose the option to expand Medicaid
coverage under the ACA, the federal government will pay 100% of
Medicaid costs of those newly eligible for Medicaid from 2014 to 2016.143
The federal share will gradually phase down to 90% in 2020, where it will
remain well above traditional federal medical assistance percentage
(FMAP) rates.144 As of March 2015, 29 states (including the District of
Columbia) adopted the Medicaid expansion.145 For those remaining states
138. Michael F. Cannon, New Kaiser Survey Suggests Obamacare is Killing Jobs,
FORBES (Sept. 16, 2016, 11:49 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelcannon/2016/09/
16/new-survey-suggests-obamacare-killing-jobs/#4c01f0437654 [https://perma.cc/EPA6-8T
SS].
139. About CMS: History, CMS.GOV (Jun. 20, 2018, 2:36 PM), https://www.cms.gov/Abo
ut-CMS/Agency-information/History/ [https://perma.cc/A8KP-4XMR].
140. Laura Snyder & Robin Rudowitz, Medicaid Financing: How Does it Work and
What are the Implications?, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (May 20, 2015), https://
www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/medicaid-financing-how-does-it-work-and-what-are-the-
implications/ [https://perma.cc/RB95-KPGA].
141. Id.
142. Matthew Buettgens et al., Medicaid Expansion, Health Coverage, and Spending,
HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (Apr. 29, 2015), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-
brief/medicaid-expansion-health-coverage-and-spending-an-update-for-the-21-states-that-ha
ve-not-expanded-eligibility/ [https://perma.cc/7ZCX-9XWB].
143. Robin Rudowitz, Understanding How States Access the Enhanced Medicaid Match
Rates, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (Sept. 29, 2014), https://www.kff.org/medicai
d/issue-brief/understanding-how-states-access-the-aca-enhanced-medicaid-match-rates/ [htt
ps://perma.cc/98TP-GLE4].
144. Id.
145. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, Status of State Action on Medicaid
Expansion Decision, https://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-around
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that did not expand;
The basis of the state and federal partnership is governed by the
federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP). . . . The FMAP
is calculated annually using a formula set forth in the Social
Security Act which is based on a state’s average personal income
relative to the national average; states with lower average
personal incomes have higher FMAPs.146
The Out–of-pocket Model means that those who are uninsured or
underinsured pay for healthcare out of their own pocket. Not surprisingly,
most can’t pay at all. Even with the multiple payer systems, at least 28
million America remain uninsured, and many remain underinsured.147
According to a Harvard study, approximately 700,000 Americans declare
bankruptcy annually due to inability to pay for medical bills.148
Congressional findings provide that 62% of all personal bankruptcies in the
U.S. are caused in part by medical expenses.149 In Britain, France, Japan,
Germany, the Netherlands, Canada, and Switzerland, the same study’s data
indicates that there are no bankruptcies due to inability to pay medical
bills.150 The dilemma is more pronounced in the states that have not
expanded Medicaid under the ACA. Individuals and families who are not
below the FPL or not in the group of eligible Medicaid recipients do not
qualify for state Medicaid benefits and may also not qualify for subsidized
insurance plans in the ACA insurance marketplace—this is known as the
“coverage gap.”151 While the ACA does impose a penalty for failure to
purchase health insurance, many find it cheaper to simply pay the penalty.
“For 2015, the ACA penalty for no health insurance was $325 per person
-expanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B
%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D [https://perma.cc/LQ93-EZ
LG] (last visited Sept. 11, 2018).
146. Snyder & Rudowitz, supra note 140.
147. MICHAL MARTINEZ, EMILY ZAMMITTI, & ROBIN COHEN, HEALTH INSURANCE
COVERAGE: EARLY RELEASE OF ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW
SURVEY, JANUARY-SEPTEMBER 2016, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/insur
201702.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8ES-QX9K].
148. David Himmelstein et al., Illness and Injury As Contributors to Bankruptcy, 24
HEALTH AFFAIRS (WEB EXCLUSIVE) W5-63, W5-66, W5-67 (2005), https://www.ncbi.nlm.ni
h.gov/pubmed/15689369 [https://perma.cc/9AVU-CVWQ].
149. 42 U. S. C. §18091(2) (2006).
150. Reid, supra note 17, at 31.
151. Rachel Garfield, Anthony Damico, & Kendall Orgera, The Coverage Gap:
Uninsured Poor Adults in States that Do Not Expand Medicaid, THE KAISER FAMILY
FOUNDATION, https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/the-coverage-gap-uninsured-poor-ad
ults-in-states-that-do-not-expand-medicaid/ [https://perma.cc/6W9H-PV24] (last visited
June 12, 2018).
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or 2% of the annual household income; whichever was higher. For 2016,
the fee [was] $695 or 2.5% of income—whichever was higher.” 152
Henry Aaron, Healthcare economist of the Brookings Institution, sums
up the U.S. fragmented healthcare system in plain terms:
[L]ike many other observers, I look at the U.S. health system and
see an administrative monstrosity, a truly bizarre mélange of
thousands of payers with payment systems that differ for no
socially beneficial reason, as well as staggeringly complex public
systems with mind-boggling administered prices and other rules
expressing distinctions that can only be regarded as weird.153
Likewise, the U.S. Government Accountability Office concluded that if the
U.S. could reduce its administrative costs for healthcare, which are also the
highest in the world, to the costs incurred by its neighboring Canada, the
savings could pay for healthcare for all uninsured Americans.154
In short, the poor and unemployed, the most vulnerable in America,
are simply left out. That does not always equate, however, to no access to
healthcare. By federal regulation, laws such as the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) have transformed the hospital
emergency room into the access point for this group.155 The nagging
problem here is that those with health insurance end up financing those
without it—known as cost shifting.
152. Understanding the Fee for Not Having Healthcare Coverage in 2016,
HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/blog/the-fee-for-not-having-health-insurance
-2016/ [https://perma.cc/3A7P-6YYP] (last visited Dec. 11, 2015).
153. Henry Aaron, The Costs of Health Care Administration in the United States and
Canada – Questionable Answers to a Questionable Question, 349 NEW ENG. J. OF MED.,
801, 801-03 (2003).
154. Reid, supra note 17, at 44.
155. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd
(1986). Congress passed EMTALA, part of the Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act
(COBRA) of 1985, in April of 1986 to address the problem of “patient dumping.” The term
“patient dumping” refers to certain situations where hospitals fail to screen, treat, or
appropriately transfer patients. According to Section 9121 of COBRA, Medicare
participating hospitals must provide a medical screening exam to any individual who comes
to the emergency department and requests examination or treatment for a medical condition.
If a hospital determines that an individual has a medical emergency, it must then stabilize
the condition or provide for an appropriate transfer. Id. The hospital is obligated to provide
these services regardless of the individual’s ability to pay and without delay to inquire about
the individual’s method of payment or insurance status. Id.
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V. THE PROBLEM OF THE UNINSURED: COST SHIFTING
As part of the enactment of the ACA, Congress made several
“Findings” which were included in the ACA legislation.156 Astonishingly,
Congress found that the “cost of providing uncompensated care to the
uninsured was $43 [billion] in 2008 [and] [t]o pay for this cost, health care
providers pass[ed] on the cost to private insurers, which [was] pass[ed] on
the cost to families.”157 The size of this subsidy was considerable. This
“cost shifting” “increase[d] family premiums by on average over $1,000 a
year.”158
In 2013, a study found that the cost of “uncompensated care” provided
to uninsured individuals soared to $84.9 billion.159 The study further noted
that only $53.3 billion was paid to help providers offset uncompensated
care costs. “Most of these funds ($32.8 billion) came from the federal
government through a variety of programs including Medicaid and
Medicare, the Veterans Health Administration, and other programs. States
and localities provided $19.8 billion, and the private sector provided $0.7
billion.”160 Parenthetically, the study did not address the amount of private
sector premium increases resulting from the shortfall. While an increase in
premiums is reasonable to assume given the pattern found by Congress, it
is difficult to find exact data because the increase in uninsured payments in
2014 coincided with an increase in deductibles and some premium costs in
the ACA marketplace as well.161
In any case, as Reinhardt observes, the system of cost shifting relies
heavily on private health insurers as agents of cost control in healthcare.162
Given that the imbalances in the allocation of market power persist
between providers—especially hospitals—and private insurers, cost control
156. 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (2018).
157. 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(F) (2018).
158. Id.
159. Teresa Coughlin et al., Uncompensated Care for the Uninsured in 2013: A Detailed
Examination, THE KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (2014), http://www.kff.org/uninsured/report
/uncompensated-care-for-the-uninsured-in-2013-a-detailed-examination/ [https://perma.cc/Y
U9P-Y33V].
160. Id.
161. Jon Gabel et al., Analysis Finds No Nationwide Increase in Health Insurance
Marketplace Premiums, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (2014), http://www.commonwealthfun
d.org/publications/blog/2014/dec/zero-inflation-nationwide-for-marketplace-premiums [http
s://perma.cc/2SWQ-UTKV].
162. Uwe Reinhardt, The Many Different Prices Paid to Providers and The Flawed
Theory of Cost Shifting: Is It Time For A More Rational All-Payer System, 30 HEALTH AFF.
2125, 2128 (2011).
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by private insurers remains an anomaly.163 The “cost control” system,
premised upon cost shifting and premium subsidies paid for by the
privately insured, obviously does not work given the large amount of
unreimbursed provider costs due to the uninsured and the large number of
Americans driven into bankruptcy because of the exorbitant costs incurred
due to serious illness. Bottom line: with cost shifting, the free market is
still not determining pricing.
How do the uninsured find treatment? Federal and state law, as well
as the mission of many providers, require hospitals and physicians to
provide care when it is most needed, regardless of the patient’s ability to
pay.164 As just observed, healthcare providers deliver significant amounts
of care to the uninsured for which the providers receive no payment or less
payment than the cost actually incurred.
For example, in 2011, 48.6 million people—15.7% of the U.S.
population—were uninsured.165 That same year hospitals lost $41.4 billion
dollars from providing uncompensated care to the uninsured.166 From
1990—four years after EMTALA was promulgated—through 2016,
hospitals lost more than $576 billion from providing uncompensated care
to the uninsured.167 Unfortunately, hospitals have no say in the matter.
EMTALA requires hospitals that receive any federal funding to provide
stabilization care for indigent patients and cannot turn away these patients
until their medical condition is in fact stabilized.168 This is true even though
low acuity patients could be better served at a lower cost in a primary care
setting or urgent care setting.169
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §1395dd; FLA. STAT. ANN. §395.1041(3)(f) (West 2017); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §61.028 (West 2017) (requiring health providers to provide
care when it is most needed).
165. See AM. HOSPITAL ASS’N, Trendwatch Chartbook 2016: Trends Affecting
Hospitals and Health Systems, at A-34 (2016) https://www.aha.org/system/files/research/rep
orts/tw/chartbook/2016/2016chartbook.pdf (reporting the number of emergency department
visits annually from 1994 through 2014, including but not limited to 90 million in 1994,
103.1 million in 2000, 114.8 million in 2005, and 129.5 million in 2011).
166. AM. HOSPITAL ASS’N., AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION:
Uncompensated Hospital Care Cost Fact Sheet 3 (2017) https://www.aha.org/system/files/2
018-01/2017-uncompensated-care-factsheet.pdf. Uncompensated care cost is a combination
of a hospital’s charity care and bad debt. Id. at 2. It is appropriate to combine charity care
and bad debt because “[b]ad debt is often generated by medically indigent and/or uninsured
patients”; therefore, there is no meaningful distinction between the two categories. Id. at 2.
167. See id. at 3.
168. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a).
169. See Lawrence Singer, Gloria Jean Ate Catfood Tonight: Justice and the Social
Compact for Health Care in America, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 613, 625 (2005) (“EMTALA
incentivizes individuals to seek care at the E.D., because they know they will be seen, even
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The reason for this rests on the shoulders of Congress. Legislative
mandates such as EMTALA were never funded by Congress after
mandating treatment for the uninsured.170 This lack of funding to pay for
care for which the federal government now refuses to pay.171 Undoubtedly,
healthcare providers cannot absorb these bad debts and continue to operate
profitably either. Instead, they raise their prices, shifting the cost of
uncompensated care to those who do pay reliably; namely, the government
and private insurance companies.172
In response, private insurers increase their premiums, shifting the cost
of the elevated bills from providers onto those who carry insurance.173 The
net result is that those with health insurance subsidize the medical care of
those without it.174 “Higher premiums, in turn, render health insurance less
affordable, forcing more people to go without insurance and leading to
further cost-shifting.”175 And it is hardly just the currently sick or injured
though a less-intensive setting may be more appropriate.”); Emergency in the Emergency
Rooms, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2006, at A16; see also Tiana Mayere Lee, An EMTALA
Primer: The Impact of Changes in the Emergency Medicine Landscape on EMTALA
Compliance and Enforcement, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 145, 166 (2004) (“Uninsured persons
and Medicaid enrollees often seek care in the emergency department, rather than in a
physician’s office.”).
170. MEGAN HEALY, BEYOND THE SAFETY NET: AMERICA’S EMERGENCY DEPARTMENTS
KEEP THE SYSTEM AFLOAT, (July 1, 2017), https://www.aaem.org/UserFiles/BeyondtheSafet
yNet.pdf [https://perma.cc/C58S-929K].
171. “EMTALA is a federal law that requires hospital emergency departments to
medically screen every patient who seeks emergency care and to stabilize or transfer those
with medical emergencies, regardless of health insurance status or ability to pay — this law
has been an unfunded mandate since it was enacted in 1986.” EMTALA (Emergency
Medical Treatment And Labor Act), AMERICAN COLLEGE OF EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS
(2009), http://newsroom.acep.org/2009-01-04-emtala-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/GYW2-K
KEV].
172. Austin Frakt, How Much Do Hospitals Cost Shift?: A Review of the Evidence, 89
MILLBANK Q. 90, 92 (2011), available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3
160596/ [https://perma.cc/8BT6-QT8D]. (“Karen Ignagni, the president and CEO of
America’s Health Insurance Plans (AHIP) described cost shifting as follows: ‘If you clamp
down on one side of a balloon, the other side just gets bigger.’”). Id. (quoting Catherine
Arnst & Jane Sasseen, Why Business Fears the Public Option, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS WEEK
(Oct. 1, 2009), available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/09_41/b41500
26723556.html.
173. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, HIDDEN COSTS, VALUE LOST: UNINSURANCE IN AMERICA
55 (2003).
174. See Frakt, supra note 172, at 53 (stating that “[t]he estimated $35 billion burden of
uncompensated care is shared among governments and private sponsors, although ultimately
individuals bear the costs of these uncompensated services as taxpayers, providers,
employees, and health care consumers.”).
175. THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT DECISION: PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
328 (Fritz Allholff & Mark Hall eds., 2014).
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among the uninsured who prompt elevation of the price of health care and
health insurance. As observed by Justice Ginsburg in the Sebelius
decision:
Insurance companies and healthcare providers know that some
percentage of healthy, uninsured people will suffer sickness or injury each
year and will receive medical care despite their inability to pay. In
anticipation of this uncompensated care, health-care companies raise their
prices, and insurers their premiums. In other words, because any uninsured
person may need medical care at any moment and because health-care
companies must account for that risk, every uninsured person impacts the
market price of medical care and medical insurance.176
Moreover, the multiple payer system results in cost shifting in the
form of profit-maximizing price discrimination as well.177 If, for example,
Medicare cuts reimbursement to a hospital for a particular procedure, the
hospital will raise the price for the same procedure to other more reliable
payers, like private insurance companies, to make up the difference. This
practice accounts for different pricing for the same procedure on the same
day in the same hospital depending on the source of payment. Even among
private insurers, there will be different payment for the same procedure
depending upon different insurance plans from the same company.
Harvard professors and authors Michael Porter and Elizabeth Teisberg
observe:
The administrative complexity of dealing with multiple prices
[for the same service] adds costs with no value benefit. The
dysfunctional competition that has been created by price
discrimination far outweighs any short-term advantages
individual system participants gain from it, even for those
participants who currently enjoy the biggest discounts.178
Data from a 2008 joint study commissioned by health insurance and
hospital industries well illustrates these added costs of profit-maximizing
price discrimination.179 The study estimates that the overall size of the cost
shift in 2007 within the multiple payer system was $88.8 billion.180 Of that
176. Nat’l. Fed’n. Of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 593-94 (2012) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
177. Reinhardt, supra note 162.
178. MICHAEL E. PORTER & ELIZABETH O. TEISBERG, REDEFINING HEALTH CARE:
CREATING VALUE-BASED COMPETITION ON RESULTS 66 (2006).
179. WILL FOX & JOHN PICKERING, HOSPITAL AND PHYSICIAN COST SHIFT: PAYMENT
LEVEL COMPARISON OF MEDICARE, MEDICAID, AND COMMERCIAL PAYERS (2008), us.millima
n.com/insight/research/health/pdfs/Hospital-and-physician-cost-shift/ [https://perma.cc/UK8
M-ZU6R].
180. Id. at 2 (Chart 1).
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total, $51 billion was estimated to have been shifted by hospitals to private
insurers: $34.8 billion because of low Medicare payments to hospitals and
$16.2 billion because of Medicaid.181 Another $37.8 billion was shifted by
physicians to private insurers: $14.1 billion because of low Medicare
payments and $23.7 billion because of Medicaid.182
The claim that cost shifting is a form of dysfunctional market
competition has merit whether due to the problem of the uninsured or due
to the complexities of the multiple payer system. Arguably, a single payer
system, financing a basic core of health services to all Americans as in the
U.K., could be cheaper and more efficient than the economic burden that
more than 25 million uninsured people place on the current healthcare
system.
VI. THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACA: WHY IT
DIDN’T REFORM
Of all the things that the ACA did do, its downfall is in part tied to
what it did not or could not do. The ACA left in place the fragmented
multiple payer system and all the attendant problems of price
discrimination, value pricing and cost shifting.
And it was long. So long in fact that not many legislators read it
before voting on it.183
In enacting the ACA, healthcare reform was at the forefront, but the
reform agenda was and still remains unclear. The ACA simply failed to
address health policy reform. While laudable in its purpose, getting
everybody insured by some plan of insurance, insurance coverage with
high deductibles or unaffordable premiums without subsidy relief has failed
to alleviate many of the problems in the current system of healthcare
delivery and access. A discernible healthcare policy agenda that addresses
access to care, cost containment, complexity of administration, and
diminishing healthcare outcomes is necessary to address many of the issues
reflected in the data. The consequences of the failure to fix policy were
underscored when litigation began to marginalize certain provisions of the
ACA legislation.184 Much of what remains post ACA is the same catalogue
181. Id. at 6.
182. Id. at 7.
183. David Bernstein, Let’s Recall Why the Affordable Care Act is So Messed Up,
WASH. POST, (June 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/w
p/2015/06/25/lets-recall-why-the-affordable-care-act-is-so-messed-up/?noredirect=on&utm_
term=.a9fd13b6a25f [https://perma.cc/K5SR-9VS7].
184. Id.
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of problems that existed before its passage.
A. Emasculation of Medicaid Expansion
As noted previously, it was the intention of Congress to achieve
almost universal healthcare by requiring all states to expand Medicaid
coverage beyond the limited list of vulnerable groups to include all
individuals with incomes below the poverty level. It was anticipated that
those below the poverty level would be covered by the state Medicaid
program and therefore, rendered ineligible for federal subsidies in the
insurance market place where other uninsured above the poverty level
would be required under the individual mandate to purchase insurance.
The individual mandate provided that if those required to purchase
insurance failed to do so, then a tax penalty would be imposed by the
IRS.185
As noted above, after the Sebelius decision struck down mandatory
Medicaid expansion by states, those below the poverty level who did not fit
into the list of vulnerable groups covered by Medicaid were dropped into a
“gap” of the uninsured under the ACA.186 Not only did the below poverty
individuals not qualify for Medicaid, they were also ineligible to obtain
premium subsidies in the insurance market exchanges making coverage
unaffordable. It is for that reason that millions of Americans remain
uninsured under the ACA.187
Twenty-six states joined the suit opposing the mandatory expansion of
Medicaid.188 The reasons were for the most part tied to the economic
uncertainty that the new burden of coverage would place on the states. The
sheer size of the program was most disconcerting as the states would now
be required to insure one in four Americans.189 While the costs of covering
the newly eligible was supposed to be covered by the federal government,
paying 100% of medical assistance costs associated with the expansion
group in most states for the first three years (2014–16) and declining
annually to 95% in 2017–19 and to 90% in 2020, etc.190 But even with this
185. THE FEE FOR NOT HAVING HEALTH INSURANCE, HEALTHCARE.GOV (2019),
https://www.healthcare.gov/fees/fee-for-not-being-covered/ [https://perma.cc/H764-AUQ
C].
186. Garfield, Damico, & Ogera, supra note 151, at 6.
187. Id.
188. Sara Rosenbaum & Timothy Westmoreland, The Supreme Court’s Surprising
Decision on Medicaid Expansion: How Will the Federal Government and the States
Proceed?, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1663, 1665 (2012).
189. Id.
190. Id.
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federal contribution, states would still incur costs. By 2020 the states were
“expected to contribute 10[%] toward the cost of medical assistance for the
newly” enrolled group.191 The federal contribution was also to remain at its
then current level in the case of medical assistance for the existing
vulnerable groups covered under Medicaid which ranged from 50% to 83%
“of total medical assistance costs.”192 States were barely able to cover
those costs.193 Finally, the ACA did not repair “the existing [inadequate]
Medicaid formula controlling payments for state administration costs,
which range[d] from 50[%] to 90[%] of the cost of administration.”194
Like the EMTALA initiative before it, the federal government sought
to impose the responsibility on the states without fully funding the
mandate. While there were other non-economic state objections, the failure
to offer a sound economic plan to support almost universal healthcare
under the current fragmented system was the most problematic.
B. Insurance Companies Back Out of the ACA Insurance Exchange
Marketplace: Guaranteed Issue, Community Rating and the
Individual Mandate
The ACA created another shift in the private insurance market through
the guaranteed issue and guaranteed mandate provisions. Congress
recognized that the guaranteed issue and community rating provisions were
only two legs of a three-legged stool and the plan would result in economic
failure unless partnered with the individual mandate. To date, the plan has
shown marked instability. . . a wobbly stool at best.
The “guaranteed issue” and “community rating” provisions were
styled by Congress as real insurance reform.195 The former provides that,
with a few exceptions, “each health insurance issuer that offers health
insurance coverage in the individual or group market in a State must accept
every employer and individual in the State that applies for such
coverage.”196 This means that an insurer may not deny coverage based on
any pre-existing medical condition and the insurance plan must cover that
condition.197 Under ordinary circumstances, insurers would respond by
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-1 to 300gg–4 (2018).
196. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–1(a) (2018).
197. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–3 (2018) (stating a group health plan may not impose any
pre-existing condition exclusion).
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charging high premiums to individuals with pre-existing conditions. If so,
this would trigger the feared “adverse-selection death spiral” in the
marketplace where high premiums would increase the number of the
uninsured and insurance companies would simply exit the federal health
insurance markets.198 The community-rating provision was added to
prevent this result.
In short, the community-rating provision requires insurers to calculate
an individual’s insurance premium based on only four factors: (1) whether
the individual’s plan covers just the individual or his family, (2) the “rating
area” in which the individual lives, (3) the individual’s age, and (4)
whether the individual uses tobacco.199 Using this criterion, the Act does
not allow an insurer to factor the individual’s health characteristics into the
price of the insurance premium.
However, the individual mandate provision--the requirement that
every individual buy insurance--was the third leg of the stool. The insurers
needed to have a guaranteed customer base to ensure a broad enough risk
pool to pay for the guaranteed issue. Those with lower actuarial risk in the
pool would subsidize those with higher risk. Unfortunately, the economic
soundness of the plan failed once again. Many of the younger and healthier
uninsured simply decided that purchasing health insurance was not an
economically sound decision because the guaranteed issue provision would
allow them to purchase the same insurance at the same cost in later years,
even with the later development of a pre-existing condition.200 The tax
penalty for non-compliance for many was a cheaper alternative than paying
insurance premiums.201 Unfortunately, without the contribution of above-
risk premiums from the young and healthy, the community-rating provision
failed to incentivize insurers to take on high-risk individuals without a
concomitant substantial increase in premiums.202 The subsequent migration
out of the federal health insurance exchanges by private insurers was
198. David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Adverse Selection in Health Insurance, 1
FORUM FOR HEALTH ECON. & POL’Y 1, 8 (1998).
199. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(1)(A) (2018).
200. American Medical Association, Improving the Health Insurance Marketplace:
Guaranteed Issue and Renewability, AMA (2015), https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/ama-assn
.org/files/corp/media-browser/public/guaranteed-issue-and-renewability.pdf [https://perma.c
c/D939-9HPX].
201. Abby Goodnough, Many See IRS Penalties More Affordable Than Insurance, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/04/us/many-see-irs-fines-as-more-
affordable-than-insurance.html [https://perma.cc/PBU4-WH2X].
202. Olga Khazan, Why So Many Insurers Are Leaving Obamacare, THE ATLANTIC,
(May 11, 2017), www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2017/05/why-so-many-insurers-are-le
aving-obamacare/526137/ [https://perma.cc/B55P-8UB6].
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palpable.203
A 2016 Kaiser Family research study provided data to illustrate the
migration of several major health insurers from the federal markets.204 The
report concludes that because of losses in the federal insurance exchange
markets, major insurers like UnitedHealth and Aetna:
[A]nnounced their withdrawal from the ACA marketplaces or the
individual market in some states. In 2016, the number of insurers
participating in each state (grouped by parent company) ranged
from 1 in Wyoming to 16 in Texas. In states that use
Healthcare.gov, it was estimated that the average number of
insurers participating in the marketplace will be 3.9 in 2017
(down from 5.4 companies per state in 2016, 5.9 in 2015 and 4.5
in 2014). Marketplace insurer participation in states using
Healthcare.gov in 2017 ranges from 1 company in Alabama,
Alaska, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Wyoming, to 15
companies in Wisconsin.205
Not only were companies leaving the market, the same study reveals
that those who remain are increasing premiums in some but not all states.
The data reflects that the cities with the largest increases in the
unsubsidized second-lowest silver plan, the most popular plan in the
marketplace, “were Phoenix, AZ (up 145% from $207 to $507 per month
for a 40-year-old non-smoker), Birmingham, AL (up 71% from $288 to
$492) and Oklahoma City, OK (up 67% from $295 to $493).”206 Again,
not all states experienced premium increases, however, those that did point
to some instability in the market both in terms of choice of provider and
cost.
The design of the ACA was a well-intentioned attempt to reform
healthcare in a partnership with the private insurance industry and the
states. The economic strategies essential to the success of the plan were
thwarted by court battles lost and the unexpected non-compliance with the
individual mandate. The ambitious blueprint simply lost essential parts that
have made real healthcare reform under the ACA illusory. As observed by
the Court in Sibelius, Congress did not build in a backup plan to cover
these contingencies despite the pre-passage debates that hearkened possible
203. Id.
204. Cynthia Cox et al., 2017 Premium Changes and Insurer Participation in the
Affordable Act’s Health Insurance Marketplaces, KFF (Nov. 1, 2016), https://www.kff.org/
health-reform/issue-brief/2017-premium-changes-and-insurer-participation-in-the-affordabl
e-care-acts-health-insurance-marketplaces/ [https://perma.cc/267S-48JB].
205. Id.
206. Id.
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opposition after passage of the Act.207
While the Act has not been totally repealed, arguably because there is
no better policy solution being offered in its place, it has also not been
mended. Another solution might be the regulatory vision of a single payer
system with basic core coverage for all. The U.S. has not harbored an
aversion to learning from other industrialized nations as our current
fragmented system suggests. Unquestionably, future congressional action
will be necessary to achieve reform.
VII. THE FAILURE OF FREE MARKETS: WHAT OTHER DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES DO
Currently, under its fragmented healthcare system, the U.S. maintains
separate but unequal systems of healthcare access for separate classes of
people. The above data shows that the U.S. pays more healthcare subsidies
per capita than other national healthcare single payer systems spend per
capita and achieves lesser health outcomes; that the uninsured place a
greater economic burden on the healthcare system than if the uninsured
were simply covered by a national health plan; and, that the bureaucratic
inefficiencies of the system contribute to waste. So, why not change?
A. The Fear of Rationing
Change is never easy and resistance to change is motivated in part by
the thinking that with all of the flaws of the current system, “the devil we
know may be far superior to the devil we don’t know.” Indeed, many
Americans are concerned that UHC means that health care will somehow
be rationed, and that access will be hindered for those who are willing to
pay for it.208 Is there some guarantee that the other global systems are
really going to be “better” than the U.S. system?
Professor Reinhardt overcomes the objection that UHC means
rationing care for Americans who will not tolerate limits on available
healthcare. Newsweek staff observes:
In our current debate on health care, many have warned that universal
207. See Nat’l. Fed’n. Of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 686 (2012)
(Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., Thomas, J., and Alito, J., dissenting) (“If Congress had thought that
States might actually refuse to go along with the expansion of Medicaid, Congress would
surely have devised a backup scheme so that the most vulnerable groups in our society,
those previously eligible for Medicaid, would not be left out in the cold. But nowhere in the
over 900-page Act is such a scheme to be found.).” Id.
208. Newsweek Staff, supra note 18.
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coverage will inevitably lead to “rationing” of health care. The argument
overlooks a basic fact: the United States already rations health care.
Indeed, every country rations health care, because no system can afford to
pay for everything. The key distinction is the way rationing happens.209
The question of which system is “better” is perhaps a misnomer
regarding health care. There is no perfect system. However, other
countries may ration health care more efficiently and with less bureaucratic
expense and reap better health care outcomes than the U.S.
B. The Global Perspective: System Comparisons
Table VII titled “Healthcare System Financing and Coverage in 18
Countries” is compiled of data collected by the OECD to provide a basis
for comparison of the healthcare systems in 18 developed countries
including the U.S.210
In summary, the various healthcare systems in other developed
countries share major commonalities despite many details that vary
between systems. All have crafted one healthcare system that applies to
everybody and everyone is covered by a single set of rules. This requires
the adoption of a plan that provides equal access to care at some level of
coverage. A single system is easier to administer and serves as a powerful
influence for cost control. Price transparency is another key component
guaranteeing one price for the same service.211 Dr. David Himmelstein, an
Associate Professor of Medicine at Harvard Medical School and a primary
care doctor at Cambridge Hospital in Cambridge, Massachusetts, told the
House Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor and Pensions that a
publicly financed, single-payer program similar to Medicare, will
effectively control costs while guaranteeing universal, comprehensive
coverage.212 He stated:
A single-payer reform would make care affordable through vast
savings on bureaucracy and profits. As my colleagues and I have
shown in research published in the New England Journal of
209. Id.
210. ELIAS MOSSIALOS ET AL., COMMONWEALTH FUND, INTERNATIONAL PROFILES OF
HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS, (Jan. 2016), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publi
cations/fund-report/2016/jan/1857_mossialos_intl_profiles_2015_v7.pdf [https://perma.cc/F
7NV-HYGT].
211. Ways to Reduce the Cost of Health Insurance for Employers, Employees, and their
Families: Hearing Before the Health, Employment, Labor and Pensions Subcommittee of
the House Committee on Education and Labor, (2009), available at http://www.pnhp.org/ne
ws/2009/april/testimony_of_david_u.php [https://perma.cc/87PC-NRCC].
212. Id.
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Medicine, administration consumes 31 percent of health
spending in the U.S., nearly double what Canada spends. In
other words, if we cut our bureaucratic costs to Canadian levels,
we’d save nearly $400 billion annually - more than enough to
cover the uninsured and to eliminate co-payments and
deductibles for all Americans.213
Not every universal healthcare system utilizes a single payer system.
Countries such as Germany, Japan and Canada, utilizing the Bismark
Model, do have multipayer systems.214 However, all providers fees must
adhere to government regulated unified payment schedules and so, cost
shifting is eliminated.215
Additionally, each system provides some variation of standardized
care offering a set of core services provided to all. For example, in France:
Lists of covered procedures, drugs, and medical devices are
defined at the national level and apply to all regions of the
country. The Ministry of Health, a pricing committee within the
ministry, and SHI [State Health Insurance] funds all play roles in
setting these lists, rates of coverage, and prices.
SHI covers the following: hospital care and treatment in public or
private rehabilitation or physiotherapy institutions; outpatient care provided
by general practitioners, specialists, dentists, and midwives; diagnostic
services prescribed by doctors and carried out by laboratories and
paramedical professionals; prescription drugs, medical appliances, and
prostheses that have been approved for reimbursement; and prescribed
health care–related transportation and home care. It also partially covers
long-term hospice and mental health care and provides only minimal
coverage of outpatient vision and dental care.216
Total health expenditures constituted 11 percent of GDP in 2013, of
which 76 percent was publicly financed.
SHI is financed by employer and employee payroll taxes (64%); a
national earmarked income tax (16%); taxes levied on tobacco and alcohol,
the pharmaceutical industry, and voluntary health insurance companies
(12%); state subsidies (2%); and transfers from other branches of Social
Security (6%).
Coverage is universal and compulsory, provided to all residents by
noncompetitive SHI.217
213. Id.
214. Reid, supra note 17, at 236.
215. Id. at 235-6.
216. Mossialos et al., supra note 210, at 60.
217. Id. at 59.
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In Britain, the statutory duty of the Secretary for Health is to ensure
comprehensive coverage.218 In practice, the National Health System
(NHS):
[P]rovides or pays for preventive services, including screening,
immunization, and vaccination programs; inpatient and
outpatient hospital care; physician services; inpatient and
outpatient drugs; clinically necessary dental care; some eye care;
mental health care, including some care for those with learning
disabilities; palliative care; some long-term care; rehabilitation,
including physiotherapy (e.g., after-stroke care); and home visits
by community-based nurses.219
The volume and scope of these services are generally a matter for
local decision-making, but the NHS Constitution also states that patients
have a right to drugs or treatment approved in technology appraisals carried
out by the National Institute of Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), if
recommended by their clinician. . . . For drugs or treatments that have not
been appraised by NICE, the NHS Constitution states that agencies shall
make rational, evidence-based decisions. . . .220
“Primary care is delivered mainly through general practitioners (GPs),
who act as gatekeepers for secondary care.”221 Rather than using patient
cost-sharing or imposing direct constraints on supply, costs in the NHS are
constrained by a global budget that cannot be exceeded. NHS budgets are
set at the national level, usually on a three-year cycle. “Coverage is
universal. All those ‘ordinarily resident’ in England are automatically
entitled to NHS care, largely free at the point of use, as are nonresidents
with a European Health Insurance Card.”222 “In 2013, the U.K. spent 8.8
percent of GDP on health care, of which public expenditure, mainly on the
NHS, accounted for 83.3 percent.”223 Most of the “funding for the NHS
comes from general taxation, and a smaller proportion from national
insurance (a payroll tax).”224
In each of these examples, the systems continue to experience
increased demand for limited services as in the U.S. Cost control remains a
universal challenge. Each system utilizes different cost control measures to
218. Id. at 49.
219. Id. at 49-50.
220. Id. at 50
221. Id.
222. Id. at 49.
223. Id.
224. Id.
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limit per capita expenditures. For example, some systems use capitation.225
Capitation provides a fixed per-patient reimbursement for each patient
serviced by a physician. The capitation amount is paid whether there is
over or under utilization of services. The point is that a unified single
payor system does not have to “break the bank” and would result in cost
savings in the US given high per capita expenditures.
These unified systems also do not prevent the rich segment of the
population from purchasing private supplemental insurance. In fact, in
Germany, rich people are given the option of opting out of the health
insurance system at their own peril.226 Most do not opt out. In Britain,
“only about three percent of medical costs are paid by private insurance.”227
In any case, there are many countries that allow private sector companies to
participate in the system of unified healthcare.228
These UHC systems are primarily financed through general tax
revenues and/or contributions by employer/employee to healthcare
accounts. Each system offers some variation of low-income protection for
the poor through government subsidies. Singapore, widely regarded as one
of the most successful, efficient, and high performing health systems in the
world has a somewhat different financing model, one which has allowed
Singapore to achieve high quality healthcare while limiting its health
spending to just 4.25 percent of its GDP.229
The government system, outlined in the 1993 White Paper,
“Affordable Health Care”230 concludes that medical services should not be
provided for free.231 The Singaporean system is hardly a welfare system.
Medisave was first implemented in 1984 as a tax exempt, interest yielding
savings plan much like the U.S. social security system.232 The program
includes employer-employee matching contributions and is designed to
cover medical costs. It is designed as a savings account and any used
225. Id. at 6-9.
226. BACCHUS BARUA & NADEEM ESMAIL, FOR-PROFIT HOSPITAL AND INSURERS: IN
UNIVERSAL HEALTH CARE COUNTRIES 14-15 (2015), https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/def
ault/files/for-profit-hospitals-and-insurers-in-universal-health-care-countries.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/JW7J-CLLL].
227. Reid, supra note 17, at 238.
228. Barua & Esmail, supra note 226, at iii.
229. Current health expenditure (% of GDP), WORLD BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.CHEX.GD.ZS [https://perma.cc/9GQX-92
HL]
230. SINGAPORE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH, AFFORDABLE HEALTH CARE: A WHITE
PAPER, 7 (1993).
231. Lim Meng-Kin, Health care systems in transition II. Singapore, part I An overview
of health care systems in Singapore, 20 J. PUB. HEALTH MED. 16, 18 (1998).
232. Id. at 18-19.
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portion remits to the contributor.233 Medisave was complimented in 1990
by a low-cost premium plan Medishield.234 Medishield is a “catastrophic
illness” plan for individuals up to the age of seventy.235 There is a co-pay
and co-insurance deductible of twenty percent.236 Medisave is mandatory
while Medishield is voluntary. Finally, Medifund is a state funded safety
net for those without the ability to pay for care. The fund is an endowment
fund created by the government and the earned interest is used to cover
medical costs.237
Another commonality among developed nations is the principle that
paying for or financing healthcare must be a non-profit economic activity.
As noted above, free market enterprise and for-profit entities may be used
in some systems to provide healthcare but not to pay for it. Again, the U.S.
is the only developed nation that allows insurance companies to make a
profit from basic health coverage. The non-profit financing decision
eliminates the conflict of interest between providing needed care and the
profit motive to deny payment.
Finally, every country enforces an individual mandate which
guarantees enough income to pay claims. While a profit cannot be made
on basic coverage, insurance companies do sell for-profit policies covering
services not included in the core set of services in the unified plan.
VIII. THE REGULATORY SOLUTION: SINGLE PAYER SYSTEM AND
UNIVERSAL HEALTHCARE
A. Guidance for a Blueprint
A blueprint for the provision of a unified single payer healthcare
system is a complicated task requiring an understanding of the factors
essential to efficiency and fairness. Guidance is imperative to ensure a
system that makes legal, economic, and political sense.
Hsiao and Heller provide a normative baseline for designing the single
payer system.238 They postulate that:
Health resources should be allocated to achieve three objectives:
(i) an optimal level of health status distributed equitably; (ii) an
adequate degree of risk protection for all; and (iii) the highest
233. Id.
234. Id. at 19.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Hsiao & Heller, supra note 47, at 8.
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possible level of public satisfaction for the entire population.239
Achieving these objectives will require making difficult
decisions about trade-offs, especially between equity and
efficiency.240
They further observe that governments should establish institutions to
finance health care and pool risk, rather than relying only on the free
market.241 At the same time recognizing that because market competition is
capable of addressing only the efficiency issue, the government has to be
responsible for the equitable financing and distribution of essential health
goods.
In conjunction, guidance for designing a UHC system is provided by
the OECD.242 The OECD observes, “UHC consists of three dimensions: (i)
the range of health services according to need; (ii) a level of financial
protection; and (iii) coverage for the entire population.”243
Tracking the progress towards UHC requires the development of a set
of suitable indicators which in turn should be part of an overall framework
of monitoring health system performance. Discussions have focused on the
need for two discrete components of health system performance: the levels
of coverage for health interventions, and financial risk protection, with a
focus on equity.244
B. Regulatory Vision
The regulatory vision of UHC proposed by this paper is based on a
single payer system for a core set of basic coverage services made available
to all Americans. The blueprint guidance combined with the global lessons
outlined above offer a starting point for drafting the plan:
First, the goal is to craft one healthcare system that applies to
everybody where everyone is covered by a single set of rules providing
equal access to core care services at some level of coverage. No American
should ever file bankruptcy again due to the inability to cover medical bills.
Second, a single system is easier administer, cheaper, and serves as a
powerful influence for cost control.
Third, that paying for or financing healthcare must be a non-profit
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. OECD, MEASURING FINANCIAL PROTECTION AND ACCESS TO SERVICES IN THE UHC
AGENDA (2014).
243. Id. at 2.
244. Id.
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economic activity.
Fourth, while a profit cannot be made on basic coverage, insurance
companies can participate and sell for-profit policies covering services not
included in the basic coverage core set of services in the unified plan.
Fifth, meaningful enforcement of an individual mandate which
guarantees a large enough risk pool to pay for claims.
Sixth, the importance of price transparency and uniform pricing for
services.
Seventh, the recognition that free market enterprise may not be a
suitable model for healthcare. That does not mean that the U.S. should
adopt a system of socialism. In fact, U.S. healthcare subsidies currently
exceed the per capita expenditures of socialist governments. A single
payer system simply provides better efficiencies and healthcare results.
Finally, there must be a national decision to define health care policy
rather than continually skirt the issues of fairness and efficiency to satisfy
influential private political interests. Political access is overshadowing
healthcare access. It is, therefore, not surprising that the U.S. healthcare
system is costly, inefficient and without equal access to basic services. It is
a seminal example of doing the wrong thing for all the wrong reasons.
C. Selecting the Core Set of Services
Despite the demonstrated global consensus that UHC is critical to
meaningful access to healthcare on a population-wide basis, there is little
consensus on the conceptual definition, meaning, and scope of UHC.
Likewise, there is “no consensus [] on whether UHC is achievable” or what
common metrics should be used for measuring progress.245 Hsiao has
previously attempted to fashion “some broad parameters” to evaluate a
country’s health policy and performance but principally from a
microeconomic perspective and not a cost feasibility perspective.246
Starting from a feasibility view-point, this proposal follows the
recommendations of some scholars, who observe that the focus of any
UHC system should be on the provision of a minimum basic package to
cover priority health needs for which there are effective low-cost
interventions.247 The core services selected in this plan reflect that
245. G. ABIIRO & M. DE ALLEGRI, UNIVERSAL HEALTH COVERAGE FROM MULTIPLE
PERSPECTIVES: A SYNTHESIS OF CONCEPTUAL LITERATURE AND GLOBAL DEBATES 2 (2015).
246. William Hsiao, What Should Macroeconomists Know About Health Care Policy? A
Primer (IMF Working Paper No. 00/136, 2000), 4.
247. Jeffrey D. Sachs, Achieving universal health coverage in low-income settings, 380
THE LANCET 944, 944 (2012).
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philosophy.
In selecting a core set of services to define the parameters of universal
healthcare coverage, reference was made to several sources and compiled
using these recommendations. The first source is the United States
Preventative Services Task Force (USPSTF).248 One of the most important
missions of the USPTF is to make “evidence-based recommendations about
clinical preventative services” included in primary care and disease
prevention.249 The USPSTF serves as an “independent, volunteer panel of
national experts in [disease] prevention and evidence-based medicine.”250
The recommendations are based on a four-step process:251
D. Step 1. Topic Nomination
The Task Force prioritizes topics based on several criteria, including
the topic’s relevance to prevention and primary care, importance for public
health, potential impact of the recommendation, and whether there is new
evidence that may change a current recommendation.
E. Step 2. Draft and Final Research Plans
Once a topic is selected, the Task Force and researchers from an
Evidence-based Practice Center (EPC) develop a draft research plan for the
topic. This plan includes key questions to be answered and target
populations to be considered.
248. About the USPSTF, U.S. Preventative Task Force (Jan. 2019),
https://www.uspreventiveservicestaskforce.org/Page/Name/about-the-uspstf [https://perma.c
c/V5M2-XKGL]. As noted in its website: “Created in 1984, the U.S. Preventive Services
Task Force is an independent, volunteer panel of national experts in prevention and
evidence-based medicine. The Task Force works to improve the health of all Americans by
making evidence-based recommendations about clinical preventive services such as
screenings, counseling services, and preventive medications. All recommendations are
published on the Task Force’s Web site and/or in a peer-reviewed journal.” Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. U.S. PREVENTIVE SERVICES TASK FORCE, UNDERSTANDING HOW THE USPSTF
WORKS: USPTF 101 7, https://www.uspreventiveservicestaskforce.org/Page/Name/understa
nding-how-the-uspstf-works [https://perma.cc/D24S-3QYN].
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F. Step 3. Draft Evidence Review and Draft Recommendation
Statement
Using the final research plan as a guide, EPC researchers gather,
review, and analyze evidence on the topic from studies published in peer-
reviewed scientific journals. The EPC then develops one or more draft
evidence reviews summarizing the evidence on the topic. Members discuss
the evidence reviews and use the information to determine the effectiveness
of a service by weighing the potential benefits and harms. Members then
develop a draft recommendation statement based on this discussion.
G. Step 4. Final Evidence Review and Final Recommendation
Statement
The Task Force and EPC consider all comments on draft evidence
reviews and the Task Force considers all comments on the draft
recommendation statement. The EPC revises and finalizes the evidence
reviews and the Task Force finalizes the recommendation statement based
on both the final evidence review and the public comments.
The final recommendation statement and a final evidence summary, a
document that outlines the evidence it reviewed, are also published in a
peer-reviewed scientific journal.252
The second source referenced includes the immunization
recommendations of the Center for Disease and Control Prevention
(CDC).253 As the nation’s primary government run health protection
agency, its mission is to save lives and protect people from health threats.254
It conducts critical science and provides health information in response to
the rise of a health threat. CDC prepares an immunization schedule which
is a set of recommendations available to all health professionals
nationally.255 The recommendations include the Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices (ACIP) Vaccine Recommendations and
Guidelines. The ACIP is a committee of the CDC selected by the Secretary
of U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and comprised of
medical and public health experts who develop recommendations on the
252. Id. at 8–11.
253. Immunization Schedules, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/schedules/index.html
[https://perma.cc/6VYD-N47L] (last reviewed Feb. 5, 2019).
254. About CDC 24-7: Mission, Role, and Pledge, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/about/org
anization/mission.htm [https://perma.cc/9BVX-ZADF].
255. Immunization Schedules, supra note 253.
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use of vaccines in the civilian population of the United States.256 The
recommendations stand as public health guidance for safe use of vaccines
and related biological products.257
The third source referenced includes the Center for Medicare and
Medicaid (CMS) guidelines for coverage of catastrophic care and tier 1
drugs. CMS is part of the Department for Health and Human Services. It
administers the Medicare program and works in partnership with state
governments to administer Medicaid. It also publishes covered services,
fee schedules and reimbursement rates to providers.258 Parenthetically, drug
tiers are how “prescription drugs are divided into different levels of
cost.”259 Drugs in Tier 1 are the cheapest options.260 Drugs in tier 5 are the
most expensive.261
Finally, the medical data studies recommending Tier 1 and Tier 2
drugs were reviewed independently from the USPSTF conclusions to
confirm medical findings.262 This included a review of approximately 32
independent drug studies. The aforementioned sources were reviewed and
a resulting sample of the core services selection for UHC is attached in
Table VIII.263 This formulary is designed to meet the requirement of the
importance of price transparency and uniform pricing for services included
in a workable blueprint design for an UHC plan.
H. Financing: Lessons Learned
Based on the data analysis above, there are four lessons that may be
learned from the global experience. First, the private insurance market
does not offer effective cost control. A single payer system offers
256. ACIP Charter, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/acip/committee/charter.html
[https://perma.cc/V27B-2A64].
257. ACIP Vaccine Recommendations and Guidelines, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/vacci
nes/hcp/acip-recs/index.html [https://perma.cc/3EKU-9SKY] (last updated Feb.14, 2019).
258. CY 2019 Physician Fee Schedule, Center for Medicare and Medicaid (Nov. 1, 2018
3:51 PM), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/PhysicianFee
Sched/ [https://perma.cc/NU9Z-CUA3].
259. How Do Drug Tiers Work?, BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD BLUE CARE NETWORK OF
MICHIGAN, https://www.bcbsm.com/medicare/help/understanding-plans/pharmacy-prescripti
on-drugs/tiers.html [https://perma.cc/4UZC-VQMJ] (last updated Aug. 9, 2018).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. See Grade Definitions After 2012, U.S. PREVENTATIVE TASK FORCE (June 2018),
https://www.uspreventiveservicestaskforce.org/Page/Name/grade-definitions [https://perma.
cc/R6J4-5YZM] (“This new definition applies to USPSTF recommendations voted on after
July 2012.”).
263. See infra Table VIII.
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substantial administrative savings.264 Those savings alone could pay for
much of the expense. The U.S. Government Accountability Office found
that if the U.S. could reduce its administrative costs for healthcare, which
are also the highest in the world, to the costs incurred by its neighboring
Canada, the amount saved could pay for healthcare for all uninsured
Americans.265 Himmelstein stated:
A single-payer reform would make care affordable through vast
savings on bureaucracy and profits. As my colleagues and I have
shown in research published in the New England Journal of
Medicine, administration consumes 31 percent of health
spending in the U.S., nearly double what Canada spends. In
other words, if we cut our bureaucratic costs to Canadian levels,
we’d save nearly $400 billion annually - more than enough to
cover the uninsured and to eliminate co-payments and
deductibles for all Americans.266
Second, health care should not be free for those who can afford to pay
for it. UHC is not the equivalent of welfare. “International experience
shows that government-managed ‘free’ public health services tend to be
inefficient and nonresponsive to patients’ needs.”267 Singapore provides
guidance in the form of its Medisave plan like the U.S. social security
system.268 Any investment type system which includes employer-employee
contributions is suitable. Thus, the regulatory vision must be one suitably
designed to find a solution to the failures that characterize the voluntary
private insurance market and the historical inefficiencies in the
mismanaged government welfare systems.
Third, price transparency and a government regulated cost structure
for services will eliminate unnecessary and costly inflation for healthcare
services and cost shifting.
Finally, a government funded safety net system for those unable to
pay for coverage either due to poverty or unanticipated life events should
be implemented. The current Medicaid gap contributing to over 25 million
uninsured Americans is unacceptable.269 The uninsured create more cost in
264. Reid, supra note 17, at 42-43.
265. Id. at 44.
266. Ways to Reduce the Cost of Health Insurance, supra note 211.
267. Hsiao & Heller, supra note 47, at 9.
268. Benedict S. K. Koh, Singapore’s Social Security Savings System: A Review and
Some Lessons for the United States, 5-7 (The Wharton Sch., Univ. of Pa., Pension Research
Council, WP2014-18, 2014), http://pensionresearchcouncil.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/u
ploads/2015/09/WP2014-18-Koh.pdf [https://perma.cc/L2TY-SUFH].
269. “In 2013, one year before the ACA went into full effect, roughly 15% of the
population was uninsured, and as many as 32 million U.S. residents were unable to obtain
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the system than if the government would simply fund a basic coverage plan
for the uninsured.
IX. THE CONCLUSION: THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT
In 2009, a study conducted at Harvard Medical School and Cambridge
Health Alliance found that uninsured, working-age Americans have a 40%
higher risk of death than their privately insured counterparts, up from a
25% excess death rate found in 1993.270 The study concludes, based upon
the data, that “uninsurance is associated with mortality.”271 The debate
over UHC has been assiduously devoid of the real life and death challenges
faced by Americans who are uninsured and underinsured. Yet, that data
may be the most critical of all. These Americans face death, bankruptcy
and a degree of hopelessness.
As Reinhardt observes: The fundamental truth about healthcare
in every country is. . . that national values, national character,
determine how each system works.”272 Therefore, “[o]nce a
nation decides that it has a moral obligation to provide healthcare
for everybody” and every day, then and only then, does it begin
to build the infrastructure necessary to implement that healthcare
system.273 The regulatory vision of healthcare must consider the
national values recognized in this country, whether articulated in
the Constitution or simply left to the development of our ideals as
a democratic nation.
coverage for different reasons (such as pre-existing conditions). The ACA became effective
January 2014; by the end of 2016, the rate of uninsured Americans had dropped to 10.9%.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that the ACA would help reduce the
national deficit by as much as $100 billion over the next decade.” Understanding the
Affordable Care Act, MED. BILLING & CODING CERTIFICATION (2018), https://www.medicalb
illingandcoding.org/health-insurance-guide/affordable-care-act/ [https://perma.cc/FR2R-2Z
HP].
270. Andrew P. Wilper et al., Health Insurance and Mortality in U.S. Adults, 99
AMERICAN J. OF PUB. HEALTH, 2289, 2289 (2009), http://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/abs/1
0.2105/AJPH.2008.157685 [https://perma.cc/A3UT-FQ2Z].
271. Id.
272. Newsweek Staff, supra note 18.
273. Reid supra note 17, at 269-70.
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TABLE III
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Select Population Health Outcomes and Risk Factors
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TABLE V
Access to Care
(OECD, 2015)
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TABLE VI
Quality of Care
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TABLE VII
Healthcare System Financing and Coverage in 18 Countries
(OECD, 2015)
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TABLE VIII
Sample/Core Set of Services Selection
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TABLE VIII
Sample/Core Set of Services Selection
USPTF Grade A and B Recommendations
Demographic Treatment CPT CPT Notes CMS Rate
Children/
Adolescents
Congenital Hypothroidism 84443 TSH $20.75
Gonococcal Neonatorium 87075 Gram Stain $11.69
Hepatitis C 80074 $58.81
HIV 86703 HIV 1&2 $16.92
Phenyleketonuria 84030 PKU $6.79
Sickle Cell Disease 83020 HGB Electrophoresis $15.89
Male
AAA 76706 $130.00
Colon Cancer Screening Colonoscopy 45378 Professional Fees + Facility + Anesthesia + Lab + Path $950.31
DM 82947 Fasting Glucose $4.85
DM 83036 HGB A1C $11.99
Hepatitis Panel 80074 $58.81
HIV 86703 $16.92
Lipid Panel 80061 $16.53
Lung Cancer Counseling G0296 $36.00
Lung Cancer Low Dose CT G0297 $249.00
Pregnancy
Bacteriuria 81001 $3.92
Pap Smear 88164 $14.65
Chlamydia 87110 $24.19
Gestational DM 82947 Fasting Glucose $4.85
Hepatitis Panel 80074 $58.81
HIV 86703 $16.92
Iron Deficiency Anemia (CBC) 85025 $9.59
Syphillis 86780 $16.34
Obstetrical Panel 80081 CBC, ABO, Antibodies, RPR, Hepatitis B, HIV, Rubella $92.42
Female
Breast Cancer 77066 Bilateral Screening Mammogram $179.14
Colon Cancer 44388 Professional Fees + Facility + Lab + Path $950.31
Pap Smear 88164 $14.65
Chlamydia 87110 $24.19
DM 82947; 83036 $16.84
Gonorrhea 87491 $43.31
Hepatitis Panel 80074 $58.81
HIV 86703 $16.92
Lipid Panel 80061 $16.53
Lung Cancer Counseling G0296 $36.00
Lung Cancer Low Dose CT G0297 $249.00
Osteoporosis 77080 Dexa SCA
